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Is It Time to Forget Science? 




The name history of science reﬂ ects a set of assumptions about what science is. 
Among them is the claim that science is a singular thing, a potentially uniﬁ ed group 
of disciplines that share a common identity. Long promoted by scientists and phi-
losophers on the basis of a supposedly universal scientiﬁ c method, this claim now 
looks very embattled. I trace its development from the early nineteenth century and 
the growth of the positivist movement to its various manifestations in the twenti-
eth century. Recently, some historians have called for the term science to be relin-
quished, and for adoption of a more relaxed pluralism. Yet the complex legacy of the 
notion of singular science cannot be so easily abandoned.
The history of science has a paradoxical relationship to the thing it studies. Although 
the name of the discipline embeds within it an assumption that a singular thing called 
science is the object of its attention, that object has become harder to pin down as his-
torical and other studies have gone in search of it. Attempts to demarcate the bound-
aries of the activity we call science have been repeatedly frustrated; claims to have 
isolated its essence or to have traced its continuity through the centuries have been 
seriously challenged. The historicization of the category of science has ended up by 
fragmenting the entity in question. To speak of science as a single thing suggests a 
degree of unity, exclusivity, and long- term continuity that the historical record does 
not seem to manifest. Science as we know it today is harder to ﬁ nd the farther we re-
cede from the present, as has often been observed by those who study the premodern 
or early modern periods. And when non- Western cultures are brought into focus, it is 
even more difﬁ cult to locate in its familiar form.
It seems, then, that the concept of science is ripe for critical examination. The 
term is central to the cultural capital of our ﬁ eld, in other words to the symbolic vo-
cabulary by which it has secured its authority. It is part of a venerable tradition, and 
as such—as historians above all should understand—is not to be dispensed with by 
mere wishful thinking. On the other hand, there has been a growing realization that 
this word science is a peculiar and rather fraught inheritance. It embraces the speciﬁ c 
ideas and practices of the scientiﬁ c disciplines, along with a complex set of meta-
scientiﬁ c beliefs and values. What we take to be science includes, along with the 
* Department of History, 20 Academic Way, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824; 
jan.golinski@unh .edu. I would like to thank the volume editors for their advice and support.
This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on October 30, 2017 09:09:31 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
20 JAN GOLINSKI
actual contents of scientiﬁ c knowledge, a whole range of peripheral assertions about 
it. These include the claims that science has a privileged grasp of the truth, that it 
constitutes the only path to sound knowledge, that it enjoys a special freedom from 
social and political inﬂ uences, that it is objective in its ﬁ ndings, and that it is univer-
sal in its application. Many of these claims have been subjected to fairly stringent 
criticism in recent years. It seems that such ideals as truth, value- neutrality, and ob-
jectivity are neither eternally unchanging nor universally accepted. Rather, they are 
historical constructs, interpreted in a range of different ways, and coming into promi-
nence at particular times for particular reasons. Several important works of historical 
scholarship have mapped this terrain, and I do not need to reiterate their conclusions 
here.1
Instead, I want to see what can be brought into focus by pursuing a different but 
related metascientiﬁ c theme: the notion that science is a singular entity, that all scien-
tiﬁ c beliefs and practices are components of one thing. This notion of “singular 
science” (as I shall call it) may be broken down into several component parts. It may 
rely on the assertion that all scientiﬁ c disciplines adhere to one kind of method, for 
example, or at least that they draw upon a common set of approaches. It may invoke 
a kind of hierarchy of the sciences, insofar as they are thought to have advanced to 
different degrees in pursuit of their common goals. Singular science may involve an 
aspiration to unify all of the scientiﬁ c disciplines at some point in the future. And it 
may also involve an insistence that science—as practiced in European civilization in 
the modern era—is a uniquely effective means of understanding and controlling the 
natural world.
I do not intend to disentangle all of the ancillary assumptions connected with the 
idea of singular science, as one might for the purposes of philosophical analysis. My 
aim is rather to explore the history of their entanglement.2 In doing this, I will show 
that the notion of singular science was advanced in response to the rise of a large 
number of new disciplines in the early nineteenth century.3 The fragmentation of the 
ﬁ eld of scientiﬁ c inquiry called forth a vision of its potential uniﬁ cation. This ideal 
was particularly characteristic of the positivist philosophy, with its model of a scale 
of perfection on which all the scientiﬁ c disciplines could be arranged. The positivist 
assertion that the disciplines had a common goal, which they would all eventually 
attain, allowed science to establish its credentials vis- à-vis other cultural domains in 
the period, such as religion and technology. Positivism also projected its vision of sin-
gular science globally, insisting that it was the only knowledge of nature that offered 
a path to material and social progress. Singular science was asserted as a component 
of European cultural hegemony in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
1 On the historical formation of notions of truth, value- neutrality, and objectivity, see Steven Shapin, 
A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth- Century England (Chicago, 1994); 
Robert N. Proctor, Value- Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass., 
1991); Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York, 2007).
2 This inquiry draws upon the work of several other historians, including Peter Galison and David J. 
Stump, eds., The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power (Stanford, Calif., 1996); 
Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago, 1999); and Peter 
Dear, The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World (Chicago, 2006).
3 On this, see Richard G. Olson, Science and Scientism in Nineteenth- Century Europe (Urbana, Ill., 
2008); Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams, “De- centring the ‘Big Picture’: The Origins of Mod-
ern Science and the Modern Origins of Science,” Brit. J. Hist. Sci. 26 (1993): 407– 32.
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 TIME TO FORGET SCIENCE? 21
The history of singular science I shall present will of course be a selective one, re-
ﬂ ecting the limits of my own knowledge. But I hope it will illuminate some aspects of 
the changing concepts of science and its history in the last two centuries. Positivism 
was not the only source of the aspiration to unify the sciences during this period, but a 
focus on the positivist movement will allow me to connect that aspiration to a speciﬁ c 
historical consciousness that ﬂ ourished in the same era. The positivist outlook in-
cluded a place for historical studies, albeit a limited one. History was assigned a role 
that subordinated it to the sciences themselves, a role dictated by the vision of their 
eventual uniﬁ cation. As the inﬂ uence of positivism has diminished in recent decades, 
history has assumed a more critical function. Historical and other studies have em-
phasized the differences between the disciplines, calling into question the purported 
singularity of the scientiﬁ c enterprise and its tendency toward unity. At the same time, 
the rise to prominence of the biological and information sciences has undermined 
positivist assumptions about the hierarchy of the disciplines. This has coincided with 
important social and technological changes that have signiﬁ cantly altered the char-
acter of the scientiﬁ c community and the perceived relationship between knowledge 
and technical practices. And the same period has also witnessed the diminished inﬂ u-
ence of European powers in global affairs, with consequent criticism of the idea that 
science has been uniquely a feature of Western civilization. All of these factors have 
undermined the traditional concept of singular science.
For historians of science, this situation raises an important set of questions. Should 
we cut ourselves loose from a concept of singular science that now looks decidedly 
threadbare? Can history of science simply rebrand itself “history of the sciences,” ac-
knowledging the plurality and diversity of its subject matter, and leave it at that? Or 
are there things we need to hang on to in the notion of singular science? Do we still 
require such an idea to secure the credentials of the ﬁ eld and provide it with a com-
mon agenda? My hope is that, by reviewing how we found ourselves at this point, we 
can reach toward some answers to these questions.
NINETEENTH- CENTURY ORIGINS
To begin, we need to go back to the early nineteenth century, since it was then that 
the modern conception of science as a singular and potentially uniﬁ ed entity was 
forged. This was a time of spectacular new discoveries and the creation of new dis-
ciplines. What was later called “classical physics” emerged at this time, centered on 
the phenomena of heat, light, and electricity, and on the concept of energy that linked 
them all. Chemistry underwent its own revolutionary developments, with crucial new 
ﬁ ndings about chemical composition. Biology arose from an intensiﬁ ed focus on 
the fundamental processes of life. The era also witnessed the growth of new institu-
tions, including those specializing in the newly recognized disciplines. In response 
to these changes, a good deal of attention was devoted to trying to deﬁ ne science, to 
demarcate its boundaries and secure its standing in society. In the English- speaking 
world, the crucial metascientiﬁ c works included John Herschel’s Preliminary Dis-
course on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830), Mary Somerville’s On the Con-
nexion of the Physical Sciences (1834), William Whewell’s History of the Inductive 
Sciences (1837) and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), and John Stuart 
Mill’s System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843). Looming over them was 
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the  massive oeuvre of Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, whose Cours de 
philosophie positive was published between 1830 and 1842.
What was new at this time was not the basic idea that all knowledge might be inter-
connected. That vision could be traced back to classical antiquity, and it had already 
inspired the encyclopedic projects of the eighteenth- century Enlightenment. What 
was new was the notion that science—meaning speciﬁ cally the study of the natural 
world—could serve as the foundation for that uniﬁ ed knowledge. It was at this point 
that the English word science acquired a somewhat narrower meaning than it had had 
before, coming to designate the body of natural and physical sciences as opposed to 
knowledge more generally. The Oxford English Dictionary gives 1867 as the ﬁ rst 
date for this usage, but the passage adduced in illustration declares that the word al-
ready bears this meaning in common speech. Indeed, Whewell pointed toward this 
more restrictive meaning in his History of 1837, when he wrote that, by using the 
criterion of correct method, “some portions of knowledge may properly be selected 
from the general mass and termed SCIENCE.”4
Although the meaning of the word science was apparently narrowed in this way, 
the inﬂ uence of positivism and other European philosophical movements also led to 
a considerable expansion in its scope of application. Science came to designate a par-
ticular kind of knowledge, but it was also hailed as a model for all ﬁ elds of inquiry 
and a focus for their potential uniﬁ cation. At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
historian J. T. Merz claimed that the vision of the uniﬁ cation of all human thought 
was the main achievement of the epoch, or “the higher work of our century.”5 As 
champions of this vision, he mentioned both philosophers, such as Comte and Her-
bert Spencer, and scientists, such as Hermann von Helmholtz and Emil Du Bois- 
Reymond, who shared the positivist notion of a universal scientiﬁ c method. The posi-
tivists saw science as the summation of all human endeavor, the ﬁ nal project in the 
historical progress of humanity. Far from being a narrowing of the conception of 
science, this amounted to a very grandiose vision of its historical importance.6
In Britain, it was Whewell who assumed the role of creating a study of science 
that would be external to scientiﬁ c investigation as such but would secure its philo-
sophical and historical credentials.7 Whewell not only coined the term scientist in 
1833, but gave substantial theoretical support to the project of the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), to whom he suggested this neologism. As 
a result, he gained a lasting reputation—in certain quarters at least—as a founder 
of the history and philosophy of science. For Whewell, as for Comte and Mill, the 
crucial idea was that the different ﬁ elds of scientiﬁ c inquiry were potentially uniﬁ ed 
by a shared method, but that they had to be distinguished in terms of the progress 
4 William Whewell, Selected Writings on the History of Science, ed. Yehuda Elkana (Chicago, 
1984), 5; emphasis in the original. I am aware, of course, that the same connotations do not surround 
the words normally translated as “science” in other European languages. The cognate terms generally 
cover a wider range of disciplines, and this suggests that the tendency to impute a singular identity 
to science may have been articulated more stridently in English- speaking countries than elsewhere.
5 John Theodore Merz, A History of European Scientiﬁ c Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 4 vols. 
(London, 1904– 12), 1:28– 45, on 33.
6 On positivism and the singularity of science in nineteenth- century Germany, see Peter Galison, 
“Introduction: The Contexts of Disunity,” and Ian Hacking, “The Disunities of the Sciences,” in Gali-
son and Stump, Disunity of Science (cit. n. 2), 1– 33 and 37– 74.
7 Richard Yeo, Deﬁ ning Science: William Whewell, Natural Knowledge and Public Debate in Early 
Victorian Britain (Cambridge, 1993), 32– 8, 145– 75.
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they had made to date in implementing it. The notion of an ordering of the disci-
plines according to their different rates of progress was taken to be a distinct advance 
beyond earlier attempts—such as those of Herschel and Somerville—to relate the 
various sciences to one another. As G. H. Lewes later put it, Comte had shown that 
all sciences are “branches of one Science, to be investigated on one and the same 
Method.”8 As Jack Morrell and Arnold Thackray have noted, the idea of singular 
science did important ideological work for the BAAS, helping to strengthen its rela-
tions with engineers, manufacturers, and professionals, and sharpening its appeal to 
the government from which it sought patronage.9
The fortiﬁ ed image of science was grounded in a sense of history. Whewell had 
an eye on the role played by contemporary political historians as he claimed the 
prerogative of legislator of science. Bound by a common method, the sciences were 
expected to look to history to measure their position along the path of progress. Some 
were recognizably more developed, and this was assumed to be because they dealt 
with simpler kinds of phenomena, though Whewell categorically denied that they 
could ever free themselves from metaphysical assumptions, as Comte had hoped. 
Nonetheless, Comte’s classiﬁ cation of six fundamental disciplines—mathematics, 
astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and sociology—was mirrored fairly 
closely in the six sections of the BAAS after 1833. And the order of the disciplines, 
as Lewes later explained, had a “necessary conformity to the actual order of the de-
velopment of natural philosophy.” He went on: “This is veriﬁ ed by all we know of the 
history of the sciences, particularly during the last two centuries.”10 Debate continued 
as to how rapidly and how exactly the moral sciences would catch up with planetary 
astronomy, which offered the prime example of the reduction of natural phenomena 
to mathematical laws. Whewell was skeptical that they would ever make the grade, 
and the BAAS accordingly conﬁ ned social and political inquiries to the domain of 
“Statistics” in Section VI (later known as Section F). Mill agreed that it remained 
uncertain whether studies of mind or society were “capable of becoming subjects of 
science in the strict sense of the term.” But he drew encouragement from the case of 
meteorology, which everyone seemed to expect would yield mathematical laws even-
tually, though it had failed to do so yet. As Mill explained: “The science of human 
nature . . . falls far short of the standard of exactness now realised in Astronomy; but 
there is no reason that it should not be as much a science as Tidology is, or as Astron-
omy was when its calculations had only mastered the main phenomena, and not the 
perturbations.”11 Questions of scientiﬁ c standing were thus brought before the tribu-
nal of history, though the historical investigation that would resolve them was strictly 
constrained by a very speciﬁ c theory of progressive development. In this manner, his-
tory became an auxiliary to the project of establishing singular science.
Conjoined in this way with a theory of scientiﬁ c method, history was used to secure 
the authority of science in the nineteenth century. Positivism continued to be in-
ﬂ uential, and the later prominence of evolutionary thinking also strengthened the 
8 Lewes, Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences: Being an Exposition of the Principles of the “Cours 
de philosophie positive” of Auguste Comte (London, 1890), 10.
9 Morrell and Thackray, Gentlemen of Science: Early Years of the British Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science (Oxford, 1981), 96, 224, 259– 60.
10 Lewes, Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences (cit. n. 8), 46.
11 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, people’s ed. (London, 1896), 
546, 553– 4.
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 historical mode of legitimation. The great Victorian sages of science, including T. H. 
Huxley, John Tyndall, and Karl Pearson, repeatedly invoked the historical vision of 
scientiﬁ c progress in their writings.12 Though each of them recognized important 
differences among the individual disciplines, they deployed the notion of singular 
science strategically to uphold the credentials of science as a whole in relation to 
other cultural ﬁ elds. In the later decades of the century, an evolutionary model of 
cultural progress strengthened the positivist expectation that science was destined 
to succeed theology and metaphysics. The theological outlook that had been so im-
portant earlier to the gentlemen of the BAAS was called into question. Instead of the 
framework of Christian belief being taken for granted, it became possible to conceive 
of religion as an observable feature of human cultures in general and a counterpart 
to science as a basic way of understanding the world. It has been noted that the term 
religion, applied in the eighteenth century to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, began 
to be extended to cover the major Asiatic faiths at just the same time as science was 
acquiring its modern meaning. Thereafter, it became possible to think of religion and 
science as complementary and even opposed systems of thought.13 The end of the 
nineteenth century saw the emergence of some celebrated works arguing that science 
was inherently in conﬂ ict with religion. In their writings, J. W. Draper and A. D. 
White adopted the positivist assumption that science and religion were necessarily 
rivals, with the former destined to supersede the latter in the course of historical de-
velopment.
Not all writers on science and religion in the period endorsed the “conﬂ ict thesis” 
concerning their relationship. The point is that it only became possible to conceive 
of the relationship—in these or other terms—when science had been deﬁ ned as a 
singular entity, with which religion (similarly deﬁ ned) could be compared. The con-
solidation of the notion of singular science also enhanced its claims for intellectual 
authority over material practice. In comments at the same meeting of the BAAS at 
which he proposed the word scientist, in Cambridge in 1833, Whewell explained 
how he saw the difference between scientiﬁ c knowledge and that of the practical arts. 
The artisan’s knowledge was inarticulate and restricted in its circulation, he claimed, 
whereas that of the scientist was explicit and public. The practitioners of the arts 
should therefore be guided by those who had a grasp of scientiﬁ c theory.14 The dif-
ferentiation of mental from manual labor, with its associated assumption that the 
mind should rule over the hand, was rooted in the thinking of the eighteenth- century 
Enlightenment, but it found a ready acceptance in the Victorian era. It was ﬂ attering 
both to those who saw themselves as theorists and to engineers and mechanics who 
aspired to the cultural validation that theoretical knowledge conferred. A few decades 
later, Tyndall defended a similar demarcation of science from mechanical skill in 
lectures at the Royal Institution in London. Somewhat more controversially, he also 
12 Paul White, Thomas Huxley: Making the “Man of Science” (Cambridge, 2003), 67– 99; Theo-
dore M. Porter, Karl Pearson: The Scientiﬁ c Life in a Statistical Age (Princeton, N.J., 2006).
13 Peter Harrison, “ ‘Science’ and ‘Religion’: Constructing the Boundaries,” in Science and Reli-
gion: New Historical Perspectives, ed. Thomas Dixon, Geoffrey Cantor, and Stephen Pumfrey (Cam-
bridge, 2010), 23– 49.
14 Morrell and Thackray, Gentlemen of Science (cit. n. 9), 259– 60; Yeo, Deﬁ ning Science (cit. n. 7), 
224– 30. On changing notions of the relationship between scientiﬁ c knowledge and material practice, 
see Lissa Roberts, Simon Schaffer, and Peter Dear, eds., The Mindful Hand: Inquiry and Invention 
from the Late Renaissance to Early Industrialization (Amsterdam, 2007).
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sought to redraw the lines dividing the domains of science and religion.15 Both of 
these strategic moves relied on the identiﬁ cation of singular science introduced by 
positivism.
Positivism also had important implications for the history of science. It promoted 
historical investigation while simultaneously tying it to the philosophical vision of 
the unity of the sciences. Comte called for the establishment of a chair in “general 
history of the sciences” at the Sorbonne as early as 1832, perceiving its importance 
in advancing his metascientiﬁ c mission. History was to be enlisted in defense of the 
authority of singular science, which was deﬁ ned by adherence to a common method. 
The historical record was to be interpreted in accordance with the positivist theory 
of progress, thereby contributing to the uniﬁ cation of the sciences. Although his-
torical study was valuable in the metascientiﬁ c realm, it had no necessary educational 
role for scientiﬁ c practitioners themselves; in the mature sciences it should give way 
to a systematic presentation of the established facts. It would be quite incorrect, in 
Comte’s view, to teach a science such as astronomy historically.16 In a sense then, the 
position of the history of science was both privileged and dependent. It was accorded 
primacy as the key to revealing the underlying method of the sciences and assigning 
each of them its correct place in the order of development. But history itself was not a 
science, and could not be one as long as it retained the narrative method and had not 
yet discovered its own laws. It was conﬁ ned to a metascientiﬁ c role, part of the posi-
tive philosophy that was itself to be transcended in the course of transition to a fully 
scientiﬁ c era of human development.
TWENTIETH- CENTURY VARIATIONS
This paradoxical situation clearly irked George Sarton, the Belgian American who 
founded the journal Isis in 1913 and agitated consistently for the institutionaliza-
tion of history of science in the ﬁ rst half of the twentieth century. Sarton’s campaign 
was launched under the aegis of positivism, in which he had been interested from his 
early days as a student of philosophy. He professed admiration for the movement’s 
founder, though he blithely acknowledged Comte’s periodic bouts of mental insta-
bility. He even recorded having “communed” with the great man’s spirit during a 
visit to his Paris home in the 1940s.17 Comte was worthy of veneration, Sarton main-
tained, though his historical scholarship never went beyond the superﬁ cial level. Sar-
ton insisted on more rigorous scholarly standards in the history of science, in order 
to buttress its claim to independent academic standing. His perspective could still 
be described as positivist, however, with its emphasis on collecting and organizing 
factual information, compiling bibliographies, and establishing the institutional basis 
for the discipline. As Peter Dear has noted, Sarton also insisted on the singularity of 
the science whose history he was studying. While noting Comte’s call for institution-
alization of the discipline, he changed its designation from “history of the sciences” 
15 Thomas F. Gieryn, “John Tyndall’s Double Boundary- Work: Science, Religion, and Mechanics in 
Victorian England,” in Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science (cit. n. 2), 37– 64.
16 Gertrud Lenzer, ed., Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings (New York, 1975), 
91– 3.
17 George Sarton, “Auguste Comte, Historian of Science: With a Short Digression on Clotilde de 
Vaux and Harriet Taylor,” Osiris 10 (1952): 328– 57.
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to “the history of science.”18 The reformulation was crucial. As far as Sarton was 
concerned, the unity of science would emerge from properly conducted historical 
scrutiny. To encourage this, it was necessary to step back from the small- scale details 
of scholarship and take the long view. The minutiae of developments in the different 
scientiﬁ c disciplines were less relevant to Sarton than the consolidated knowledge 
formalized in textbooks. Stories of individual accomplishment should ideally be 
synthesized into general accounts of eras and cultures. Then, the overall pattern of 
prog ress would be discerned and the unity of scientiﬁ c knowledge correctly grasped. 
Sarton’s Introduction to the History of Science was projected as a massive and com-
prehensive work to convey this uniﬁ ed vision. It was never more than partially com-
pleted, two volumes being published in 1927 and one more in 1948.
Sarton’s vision of the discipline combined his positivist outlook with a deeply held 
commitment to paciﬁ sm and international solidarity. He believed that the codiﬁ ca-
tion and uniﬁ cation of all human knowledge would form the basis of global harmony 
and point the path toward the ending of military conﬂ ict. Launching his journal Isis 
on the eve of World War I, Sarton insisted that the positivist ideal of the unity of 
science was a buttress against national and ethnic rivalries, a prop for international 
cooperation, and a spur toward human unity. The grim alternative was intellectual 
and social fragmentation. As he later put it: “The fact that the building up of science 
has been done in the past and is done today by men of various races and many nation-
alities, inspired by different faiths, speaking different languages, proves that these 
men have the same needs and aspirations, reason in the same way, and, as far as they 
collaborate in the essential task of mankind, are united.”19 In Sarton’s vision, then, 
the history of science was the heritage of the human species as a whole, a testimony 
to its common investment in the essential task of mankind. Sarton thus gave singular 
science its most profound signiﬁ cance, hailing its development as the central theme 
of human history and the brightest hope for the future.
The vision of singular science as a collective enterprise of humanity as a whole 
was shared by other inheritors of the positivist outlook in the early twentieth century. 
As Lewis Pyenson and Christophe Verbruggen have shown, Sarton drew upon the 
work of the Belgian bibliographers Paul Otlet and Henri- Marie Lafontaine, whose at-
tempts to categorize and index all knowledge reﬂ ected their internationalist vision.20 
Sarton’s activities in turn inspired those of the Italian scholar Aldo Mieli, founder of 
the Archivio di storia della scienza in 1919 (renamed Archeion in 1927) and of the 
International Academy of the History of Science in 1929.21 Similar political ideals in-
formed the work of the Unity of Science movement, associated with the logical posi-
tivists of the Vienna Circle. Members of this group, including Otto Neurath, Philipp 
Frank, Charles Morris, and Rudolf Carnap, emphasized the methodological features 
common to all of the sciences. Their approach was philosophical rather than his-
torical, but it issued in an encyclopedic project similar in scope to Sarton’s and more 
18 Dear, “The History of Science and the History of the Sciences: George Sarton, Isis, and the Two 
Cultures,” Isis 100 (2009): 89– 93.
19 George Sarton, “Four Guiding Ideas,” in Sarton on the History of Science, ed. Dorothy Stimson 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 15– 22, on 15. This essay was originally published in 1947.
20 Pyenson and Verbruggen, “Ego and the International: The Modernist Circle of George Sarton,” 
Isis 100 (2009): 60– 78.
21 Robert Fox, “Fashioning the Discipline: History of Science in the European Intellectual Tradi-
tion,” Minerva 44 (2006): 410– 32.
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extensively realized: the International Encyclopedia of Uniﬁ ed Science, of which 
twenty monographs were published by the University of Chicago Press between the 
mid- 1930s and the early 1960s. For Neurath, the uniﬁ cation of scientiﬁ c knowledge 
was a distant prospect rather than an immediate goal; the encyclopedia was intended 
to facilitate the communication among scientists that could gradually bring it about. 
His campaign for this kind of uniﬁ cation was linked to his belief in socialist eco-
nomic planning, which he attempted to put into practice in the short- lived Bavarian 
revolution after World War I, in leftist administrations in Vienna, and in work with the 
Bauhaus movement in the Weimar Republic.22 Frank, an Austrian physicist and phi-
losopher of liberal outlook, and Morris, an American pragmatist philosopher, shared 
to some degree Neurath’s social vision for the Unity of Science project.
The social dimension of the movement was largely lost sight of after its leading 
members relocated to the United States in the 1930s, especially in the face of the 
concerted anticommunist campaign in the years after World War II. During the Cold 
War, American suspicion of internationalist and socialist political programs led to the 
rise of a purely technical version of logical positivism, associated with Carnap, Hans 
Reichenbach, and Herbert Feigl. As George A. Reisch has recently documented, 
Neurath’s death in 1945 left the movement without the most articulate spokesman for 
its political vision.23 Morris faced pressure from anticommunist agitators in Chicago, 
while Frank and Carnap were subjected to FBI investigation as suspicious foreigners. 
At this juncture, logical positivism was refocused on technical issues of epistemol-
ogy, abandoning the popular and collectivist social aims originally invested in the 
Unity of Science movement.
The idea of singular science nonetheless lived on, accorded a common respect—
though understood differently—by each side in the ﬁ erce ideological conﬂ icts of the 
middle decades of the twentieth century. Despite deep divisions between Marxists 
and anti- Marxists in this period, both sides sought to borrow the cultural capital of 
science. In some respects, twentieth- century Marxism nurtured a continuation of the 
positivist tradition, though positivism was also ﬁ ercely criticized in some commu-
nist countries for its opposition to materialist metaphysics. Many Marxists embraced 
the notion of singular science, often claiming that dialectical materialism itself had 
scientiﬁ c status and had revealed the long- sought laws of historical development.24 
The internationalist outlook associated with this was upheld by such leftist scholars 
as Joseph Needham and Benjamin Farrington, both of whom were involved with the 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁ c, and Cultural Organization) Com-
mittee for History and Social Relations of Science in the 1940s.
On the other hand, the anti- Marxists who played an important role in institution-
alizing the history of science in the West conceded nothing in their admiration of 
science, though they often understood it in a pointedly antipositivist manner. Thus, 
the Russian émigré Alexandre Koyré set out his idealist model, in which scientiﬁ c 
knowledge was said to rely on metaphysical foundations adopted prior to sensory 
22 Richard Creath, “The Unity of Science: Carnap, Neurath, and Beyond,” and Jordi Cat, Nancy 
Cartwright, and Hasok Chang, “Otto Neurath: Politics and the Unity of Science,” in Galison and 
Stump, Disunity of Science (cit. n. 2), 158– 69, 347– 69.
23 Reisch, How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic (Cam-
bridge, 2005), esp. 1– 26, 259– 76.
24 Terrell Carver, “Marx and Marxism,” in The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 7: The Modern 
Social Sciences, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross (Cambridge, 2003), 183– 201.
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experience. Koyré was strongly antipathetic to Marxism or anything tainted by as-
sociation with it; his views had a deep inﬂ uence on conceptions of the “Scientiﬁ c 
Revolution” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For Koyré, the intellectual 
transformation of that era was identiﬁ ed with the rise of a new theory of motion and 
the “geometrization” of space, especially in the works of Galileo and Descartes.25 
Koyré’s antipositivist and antiempiricist conception of science was inﬂ uential with a 
whole generation of American and British historians, including Herbert Butterﬁ eld, 
A. Rupert Hall, and Richard S. Westfall.26 On a more popular level, the books of the 
Hungarian writer Arthur Koestler also advocated an idealist view of science, in which 
individual geniuses such as Johannes Kepler assumed the role of intellectual revo-
lutionaries. A recent biography of Koestler has shown how he was drawn to meta-
physical and psychological studies of science after gaining fame as an anticommunist 
novelist and polemicist in the postwar period.27
Thus, singular science enjoyed veneration on both sides of the ideological gulf of 
these years. Marxist historians, from the Soviet physicist Boris Hessen in the 1930s to 
the Irish crystallographer J. D. Bernal in the 1950s, tended to accept a rather similar 
characterization of the intellectual contents of science as their anti- Marxist oppo-
nents. They set out to uncover the material and economic needs that had given rise to 
the intellectual structure in question.28 A recent commentator has written of Bernal, 
“He was quite as ‘idealist’ a historian of scientiﬁ c ideas as anyone can imagine in 
the ‘bourgeois camp.’ ”29 Marxists shared with their ideological enemies a tendency 
to view science as a single thing, primarily identiﬁ ed with a set of metaphysical as-
sumptions that could change dramatically in quite a short period. Hence the common 
interest in the Scientiﬁ c Revolution of the early modern era. The gaps appeared in 
other areas of history, such as the Enlightenment, which was not properly brought 
into focus by either camp. Idealists tended to see the eighteenth- century movement as 
a mere aftershock of the intellectual revolution of the previous century, while Marx-
ists viewed it as a bourgeois diversion prior to the more important Industrial Revo-
lution.30
Nobody better demonstrates the ambiguities of Marxist historiography in the twen-
25 Roy Porter, “The Scientiﬁ c Revolution: A Spoke in the Wheel,” in Revolution in History, ed. Por-
ter and Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge, 1986), 290– 316; David C. Lindberg, “Conceptions of the Scien-
tiﬁ c Revolution from Bacon to Butterﬁ eld: A Preliminary Sketch,” in Reappraisals of the Scientiﬁ c 
Revolution, ed. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge, 1990), 1– 26.
26 David A. Hollinger, “Science as a Weapon in Kulturkämpfe in the United States during and after 
World War II,” Isis 86 (1995): 440– 54; Anna K. Mayer, “Setting Up a Discipline: Conﬂ icting Agen-
das of the Cambridge History of Science Committee, 1936– 1950,” Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 31 (2000): 
665– 89.
27 Michael Scammell, Koestler: The Literary and Political Odyssey of a Twentieth- Century Skeptic 
(New York, 2009).
28 On Hessen, see Loren R. Graham, “The Socio- political Roots of Boris Hessen: Soviet Marxism 
and the History of Science,” Soc. Stud. Sci. 15 (1985): 705– 22; Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A 
Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s, 2nd ed. (London, 1988), 138– 
49; Anna K. Mayer, “Setting Up a Discipline II: British History of Science and the ‘End of Ideology,’ 
1931– 1948,” Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 35 (2004): 41– 72. On Bernal, see Andrew Brown, J. D. Bernal: The 
Sage of Science (Oxford, 2005).
29 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientiﬁ c Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago, 1994), 220.
30 For more on the neglect of Enlightenment science, see William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon 
Schaffer, “Introduction,” in The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, ed. Clark, Golinski, and Schaffer 
(Chicago, 1999), 3– 31.
This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on October 30, 2017 09:09:31 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
 TIME TO FORGET SCIENCE? 29
tieth century than the English Sinologist Joseph Needham. Needham’s monumental 
studies of the history of Chinese science opened up the issue of the comparative study 
of non- European cultures, with important implications for the notion of singular 
science. Needham had a famously heterodox intellectual formation, in which Marx-
ism, Christianity, and Taoism jostled in sometimes uneasy proximity, and his massive 
scholarly labors gave him an unrivaled knowledge of Asian and European cultures. 
With his training in biochemistry and developmental biology, he was uncomfort-
able with the positivist hierarchy of the sciences. He disputed the right of physics to 
be considered the model for all science, though he sometimes also paid homage to 
the idea that science was a singular entity. He said the initial spur to his research on 
China was the question of why modern science had arisen only in Europe—a for-
mulation that took for granted that science was deﬁ ned by the European experience. 
But, as Needham’s research accumulated, it succeeded in showing the magnitude and 
range of the Chinese accomplishment and implicitly made the case for the diversity 
of sciences in different cultures.31 So, although the famous “Needham question” was 
premised on an assumption of the singularity of science, in the end his work under-
mined the whole idea that science was a uniquely European enterprise. As H. Floris 
Cohen has shown, Needham gave no deﬁ nitive or unambiguous answer to his own 
question. While he cited Koyré’s description of the Scientiﬁ c Revolution as a trans-
formation in metaphysics, he denied its completeness because it ignored the biologi-
cal sciences.32 Needham also included technology and medicine within his capacious 
vision, unlike Koyré, who ﬁ rmly segregated such applied ﬁ elds from science’s intel-
lectual core.
In these ways, Needham pointed forward to the new world in the last few decades 
of the twentieth century, in which notions of singular science had to be reconsid-
ered. Assumptions of the uniqueness of European modes of understanding were in-
creasingly called into question in an era of increased global communications. Pro-
gressive politics in the West, which used to be identiﬁ ed with the uniﬁ cation of the 
sciences and the singularity of the European achievement, now came to embrace 
multicul turalism, which implied that the sciences might take forms other than just 
the canonical one. Needham was a critical ﬁ gure in this transformation. Sometimes 
he emphasized the singularity of science as the common enterprise of humankind 
as a whole, in the internationalist manner of Sarton, Neurath, and Bernal. At other 
times, he acknowledged its diversity in relation to cultural differences and historical 
change. In this way, he foreshadowed the trouble that lay ahead for the idea of sin-
gular science.
Needham’s farsightedness in this connection is illuminated by a comparison with 
his Cambridge contemporary C. P. Snow. Snow’s much- discussed lecture of 1959, 
“The Two Cultures and the Scientiﬁ c Revolution,” conﬁ dently reiterated the notion 
31 Gregory Blue, “Joseph Needham,” in Cambridge Scientiﬁ c Minds, ed. Peter Harman and Simon 
Mitton (Cambridge, 2002), 299– 312; Simon Winchester, The Man Who Loved China: The Fantastic 
Story of the Eccentric Scientist Who Unlocked the Mysteries of the Middle Kingdom (New York, 
2008); Needham, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West (London, 1969); Need-
ham, “The Making of an Honorary Taoist,” in A Selection from the Writings of Joseph Needham, 
ed. Mansel Davies (Jefferson, N.C., 1990), 29– 54; Needham, Science and Civilization in China, ed. 
Christopher Cullen, 24 vols. (Cambridge, 1954– ).
32 Cohen, Scientiﬁ c Revolution (cit. n. 29), 418– 82, esp. 445.
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of the singularity of science.33 By “the scientiﬁ c revolution,” Snow meant not the 
early modern shift in metaphysical outlook described by Koyré, but the ongoing tech-
nological transformation of modern society since industrialization. The key to this 
process, in Snow’s view, was the knowledge base of Western science. He proclaimed 
that European scientiﬁ c education was the sine qua non of material progress. Coun-
tries elsewhere in the world had simply to educate scientists in the approved way and 
industrial development would follow. Snow’s outlook was thoroughly imbued with 
the assumption of the uniqueness of European science and the particular version of 
internationalism that derived from it. And, of course, he also trumpeted the singu-
larity of scientiﬁ c culture when contrasting it with that of literary intellectuals. The 
scientiﬁ c and the literary spheres constituted the “two cultures” for which his lecture 
became famous. Comparing science with a degenerate literary modernism, he de-
clared that the former was superior both as an intellectual outlook and as a repository 
of moral values. He subsequently resisted proposals that the two cultures should be 
increased to three or more to recognize the social sciences or other academic ﬁ elds. 
Singular science remained crucial to Snow’s whole perspective. And because his lec-
ture was so inﬂ uential—not least in inspiring the establishment of programs in his-
tory of science and allied subjects to “bridge” the two cultures—he breathed new life 
into the notion.
Just three years later, however, Thomas S. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolu-
tions provided the occasion for more intensive scrutiny of singular science.34 This is 
not to say that Kuhn was setting out to completely subvert established ideas. In fact, 
it has been plausibly argued that his aims were not really radical at all, and his inﬂ u-
ence was out of all proportion to his intentions. In many respects, he stuck closely to 
the classical notion of singular science. His idea that certain “paradigms” guide the 
development of the “mature” scientiﬁ c disciplines suggested a uniform standard of 
method. And he closely followed the positivist hierarchy of the disciplines in mark-
ing when different ﬁ elds had achieved paradigmatic form: the mathematical sciences 
in antiquity, experimental physics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, chem-
istry somewhat later, and the biological sciences only in the nineteenth century and 
since. When Kuhn declared that the social sciences had yet to create their paradigms, 
he was echoing Comte’s sentiments of more than a century before. Furthermore, 
mature, paradigmatic, or “normal” science was characterized by Kuhn as a self- 
contained world, largely segregated from those large- scale social forces he classiﬁ ed 
as “external.”35 As such commentators as Steve Fuller have pointed out, this clearly 
reﬂ ected the assumptions of the Cold War scientiﬁ c intelligentsia from which Kuhn 
emerged.36 It was taken for granted in those circles that scientiﬁ c progress would take 
the form of increasing specialization and professionalization of the various ﬁ elds 
of research. Scientists were expected to focus on ever- narrower topics of study as 
they isolated themselves institutionally, organizing their own social arrangements 
33 Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge, 1993).
34 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1970).
35 Ibid., 69. See also Steven Shapin, “Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of 
Science as Seen through the Externalism- Internalism Debate,” Hist. Sci. 30 (1992): 333– 69.
36 Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago, 2000), 1– 37. See also 
Reisch, How the Cold War (cit. n. 23), 229– 33; Philip Mirowski, “What’s Kuhn Got to Do with It?” in 
The Effortless Economy of Science? (Durham, N.C., 2004), 85– 96.
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independently of forces in the wider society. Again reﬂ ecting the assumptions of his 
milieu, Kuhn remarked that this form of social organization had originated in early 
modern Europe and was to be found exclusively in the cultures that descended di-
rectly from it.37
On the other hand, Kuhn’s book was received in an intellectual climate that was 
growing increasingly skeptical about the idea of singular science.38 Many contem-
poraries read his work as opening the door to a more discriminating and rigorously 
historical account. Kuhn was more a symbol of these changes than a leader of them; 
he subsequently disavowed what he took to be the wildest misinterpretations of his 
work. But that does not mean that those who perceived radical implications in his 
writings were altogether mistaken.39 In certain respects, Kuhn’s model did under-
mine the program of singular science, despite the fact that the book appeared as a 
volume in the International Encyclopedia of Uniﬁ ed Science, founded by Neurath 
and his colleagues from the Vienna Circle. Kuhn noted that scientiﬁ c methods and 
practices were not universal, but localized within quite tightly bounded communities 
of practitioners. He acknowledged that phenomena could not be observed raw, but 
were always interpreted through a framework of preconceptions and according to 
assumptions bound up with the use of certain instruments. And he recognized that, 
while paradigms guided scientiﬁ c research, they did not determine what sense could 
be made of new experiences. Concepts did not come prepackaged with all of their 
possible applications; they were ﬁ tted to the ﬁ ndings of inquiry by a process of in-
terpretive fudging and creative extrapolation. If one took seriously these aspects of 
Kuhn’s perspective, then science appeared as a methodologically looser and much 
more fragmented activity than the positivist tradition had allowed.
One group of his interpreters who developed Kuhn’s insights in this direction 
were the members of the Edinburgh school, who advanced the so-called Strong Pro-
gramme in science studies in the 1970s and early 1980s. The philosopher David 
Bloor and the sociologist Barry Barnes seized particularly on Kuhn’s debts to the 
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.40 Kuhn’s vision of normal science as the crea-
tive and undetermined extension of existing ideas echoed Wittgenstein’s insistence 
that rational thought was not governed by logical rules and that language was always 
changing in response to practical needs. This suggested that the meanings of scien-
tiﬁ c ideas were related to the local circumstances and immediate needs of investiga-
tors; they were not determined by logical deduction from some more general theory. 
To the Edinburgh school, the fundamental implication of this was clear, though Kuhn 
himself had not perceived it. Science was a social enterprise at its very core, since 
the concepts and methods that constituted paradigms were the attributes of small 
37 Kuhn, Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions (cit. n. 34), 168.
38 For background, see Michael Aaron Dennis, “Historiography of Science: An American Perspec-
tive,” in Companion to Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Dominique Pestre (Lon-
don, 2003), 1– 26; Hollinger, “Science as a Weapon” (cit. n. 26).
39 For a more developed argument on this point, see Jan Golinski, “Thomas Kuhn and Interdisciplin-
ary Conversation: Why Historians and Philosophers of Science Stopped Talking to One Another,” in 
Integrating History and Philosophy of Science: Problems and Prospects, ed. Seymour Mauskopf and 
Tad M. Schmaltz (Dordrecht, 2012). A contrasting account of recent trends in science studies, which 
roots them in a series of “misunderstandings” of the works of postpositivist philosophers, is given by 
John H. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post- positivism in the Study of Science from 
Quine to Latour (Chicago, 2004).
40 Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (London, 1982); Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of 
Knowledge (London, 1983); Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1991).
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groups united by their focus on a common task. Social relations within such groups 
had an immediate bearing on how science was done; they were not at all external to 
its  practice.
The most prominent application of this claim was in the studies of scientiﬁ c con-
troversies that ﬂ ourished among historians and sociologists of science in the 1980s. 
The sociologists Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch led the way, documenting the dis-
putes over physicists’ attempts to detect gravity waves or solar neutrinos.41 Historical 
studies followed in their footsteps, by Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, Martin Rud-
wick, James Secord, and others. They scrutinized the controversies surrounding Rob-
ert Boyle’s experiments with the air pump, Isaac Newton’s work on light and colors, 
and Victorian geologists’ mapping of the Earth’s strata.42 When such debates were 
studied with due attention to both sides, they seemed to be not just about facts, but 
about methods, instruments, competences, and indeed the whole direction science 
should take. What Kuhn had called “incommensurable paradigms” seemed to be 
squaring off against each other. In Kuhn’s own phrase (echoing Wittgenstein), “in-
compatible modes of community life” were at stake.43 The methods and practices of 
the sciences were found to differ, not just in different civilizations and nations, but 
even at the level of individual researchers. With the exposure of such apparently un-
bridgeable chasms between practitioners in the same ﬁ eld, a sharp blow was dealt to 
the notion of singular science.
CONTEMPORARY PROSPECTS
The exposure of deeply rooted controversies at the leading edges of scientiﬁ c re-
search is but one of the ways in which the idea of singular science has been eclipsed 
in recent years. The themes of diversity, disunity, and localism have come to over-
shadow those of consistency, uniﬁ cation, and universalism in analyses of scientiﬁ c 
practice. There are many factors that have shaped the current situation, and it is clear 
that only a small part of the responsibility can be laid at the door of Thomas Kuhn. 
In the last few decades, the ﬁ eld of science studies has come to embrace political, 
economic, and literary disciplines, as well as the traditional triad of history, philos-
ophy, and sociology. These academic interests have intersected in complex ways with 
broader cultural and intellectual changes, often summarized under the label postmod-
ernism, and with remarkable developments in the sciences themselves. As individu-
als of all nations have become scientists, questions of cultural diversity have been 
raised much more directly than C. P. Snow could ever have imagined. The entry of 
more women into professional positions has both inspired and been encouraged by 
41 Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientiﬁ c Practice (Beverly Hills, Calif., 
1985); Pinch, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Solar Neutrino Detection (Dordrecht, 1986).
42 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air- Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life 
(Princeton, N.J., 1985); Schaffer, “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment,” in 
The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, ed. David Gooding, Pinch, and Schaffer 
(Cambridge, 1989), 67– 104; Rudwick, The Great Devonian Controversy: The Shaping of Scientiﬁ c 
Knowledge among Gentlemanly Specialists (Chicago, 1985); Secord, Controversy in Victorian Geol-
ogy: The Cambrian- Silurian Dispute (Princeton, N.J., 1986). Also important in directing historians’ 
attention to the value of the Edinburgh perspective was Shapin, “History of Science and Its Sociologi-
cal Reconstructions,” Hist. Sci. 20 (1982): 157– 211.
43 Kuhn, Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions (cit. n. 34), 94.
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increased academic attention to the role of gender in science. These changes have 
enhanced the appeal of a model of science that emphasizes pluralism rather than 
uniﬁ cation, and that recognizes how knowledge remains tied to the attributes of local 
cultures rather than entirely escaping from them. In addition, scientiﬁ c knowledge 
has been implicated as both cause and effect in the staggering technological advances 
of recent decades. The ubiquity of information technology in all kinds of scientiﬁ c 
research has made it impossible to maintain the ﬁ ction that technological change 
is always dependent on prior advances in “pure” science. The rise of the biologi-
cal sciences has been especially notable in this period, undermining the positivist 
claim that physics is the preeminent discipline. Additional sciences have emerged 
with bewildering rapidity, and interdisciplinary ﬁ elds have proliferated as the foci of 
research and pedagogy. All of this has tended to conﬁ rm the impression that the tra-
ditional notion of a singular and prospectively uniﬁ ed science is obsolete—that the 
diverse ﬁ elds of contemporary inquiry and innovation cannot all be subordinated to 
a single method or ideal.
In this situation, historical studies have turned for inspiration to philosophical tra-
ditions other than positivism, in which the singularity of science has not been so 
readily accepted. In a recent account of these traditions, Hans- Jörg Rheinberger has 
argued that Kuhn did no more than synthesize the conclusions of “a protracted effort 
that took various forms over a good half- century, despite the contemporary philo-
sophical dominance of logical positivism.”44 Rheinberger locates the roots of scien-
tiﬁ c pluralism in the turn toward history by certain philosophers of science in the 
early twentieth century. He points in particular to the importance of the 1920s, when 
ideas about the plurality of scientiﬁ c cultures were provoked partly by the revolu-
tionary developments in physics and partly by reﬂ ections on the biological sciences. 
The former were of interest to the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard, who drew 
the conclusion that scientiﬁ c ideas were tied to very localized arrangements of ex-
perimental apparatus and the phenomena they exhibited. Working in the biological 
sciences at the same time, the Polish immunologist Ludwik Fleck drew similar con-
clusions about the local speciﬁ city of scientiﬁ c cultures. Fleck wrote of the styles of 
thinking characteristic of particular laboratories and of the material practices that lay 
behind them. The writings of these two authors, along with the more general philo-
sophical perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Cassirer, are 
seen by Rheinberger as having laid the foundations for the more widespread emer-
gence of pluralistic notions of science in the years after World War II.
Rheinberger’s narrative can be read as a counterpart to my own. While I have 
traced the long legacy of nineteenth- century positivism, he has shown that it was nur-
turing the roots of postpositivism even during its heyday. At the least, this serves as a 
salutary corrective to the temptation to see pluralistic ideas about science as entirely 
due to very recent cultural trends. Taking that line, some commentators have sought 
to pin the blame on the liberalism of the 1960s, on the feminism and postcolonial-
ism that emerged from that decade, or on the postmodernism that came to the fore in 
the 1980s. These were the targets in the so-called science wars of the 1990s, when 
what was thought to be an attack on science drew forth a vituperative response from 
44 Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay (Stanford, Calif., 2010), 79– 80.
This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on October 30, 2017 09:09:31 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
34 JAN GOLINSKI
its self- appointed defenders.45 The clamor of that battle should not obscure the fact 
that criticisms of the positivist vision of science had been brewing for several decades 
already. And a central feature of these criticisms was the theme that science was not 
a singular thing. To those who recognized this, the science wars seemed like a noisy 
distraction, a hubbub of mutual incomprehension. If science is not a single entity, 
then it is not really possible either to attack or to defend it as such. Critics of the no-
tion of the singularity of science were not, of course, attacking the sciences, or even 
any part of them. Nor were they likely to be persuaded by reiterations of the tradi-
tional positivist line by those who claimed to be defending science itself.
If the polemics of the 1990s conﬁ rmed that the idea of singular science had taken 
a beating by the end of the twentieth century, they also showed that it was not en-
tirely extinct. Indeed, some of those who sprang to the defense of science enthusi-
astically reasserted the possibility of the uniﬁ cation of scientiﬁ c knowledge. A few 
physicists prophesied the imminent reduction of natural phenomena to a single all- 
encompassing law, or the uniﬁ cation of physical forces through new discoveries of 
subatomic particles. Some biologists foresaw the expansion of Darwinian natural 
selection beyond plants and animals to cover the evolution of the inorganic world 
and human culture as well. Visions of the singularity of science, it seemed, could 
themselves take multiple forms. On the other hand, even while the onslaughts of the 
critics were being vehemently repulsed, the journalist John Horgan found several 
prominent scientists who acknowledged that singular science as it had traditionally 
been understood was coming to an end.46 In the course of a series of interviews with 
leading practitioners, he uncovered what he called an “ironic” attitude of contempo-
rary scientists to their past. Many of them were highly conscious of the complexities 
and discontinuities in the historical record, hesitant to predict the future, reluctant to 
prophesy that the truth would ﬁ nally be found, and aware that—in the long term—
current ideas would pass away. As Horgan pointed out, this kind of ironic sophistica-
tion about the history of science is also a widespread characteristic of our age.
This complex situation frames current debates about the central issue I have been 
discussing: the relationship between the belief that science is a singular entity and the 
consciousness of its history. In the positivist tradition, the history of science was read 
as a narrative of progress, of the accumulation of knowledge and the gradual reduc-
tion of phenomena to regular laws. This account provided a guarantee that scientiﬁ c 
knowledge would in time be uniﬁ ed, as the different disciplines in turn attained the 
form of a true science. The scientists Horgan interviewed seem to have realized that 
that guarantee has now been withdrawn. Singular science, whose unity was forecast 
on the basis of a speciﬁ c interpretation of the past, has lost the warrant of history. In 
this sense, if in no other, the end of science is upon us.
Professional historians, at least, seem unworried by this. Indeed, they have expe-
rienced the release from positivist expectations as something of a liberation. Few 
historical narratives now trumpet unidirectional progress and the march toward the 
uniﬁ cation of knowledge. On the contrary, most of them stress fragmentation and 
45 For illuminating commentary on the science wars, see Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science 
(cit. n. 2), 336– 62; Arkady Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclas-
sical Thought, and the “Two Cultures” (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2002), 157– 99; John Guillory, “The Sokal 
Affair and the History of Criticism,” Crit. Inq. 28 (2002): 470– 508.
46 Horgan, The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientiﬁ c Age 
(New York, 1996).
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localization. In this manner, research on the history of the sciences has largely freed 
itself from the notion of singular science, which was its primary source of legitimacy 
when positivism held sway. In addition, recognizing the plurality and disunity of the 
sciences makes it easier to claim a place for history among them. No longer striving 
to model itself after the physical sciences, history can escape from the subordinate 
position to which positivism conﬁ ned it. One can even argue, as Roger Smith has re-
cently, that all humanistic study is historical to one degree or another, and hence that 
history has a fundamental role in all of the “human sciences.”47
On the other hand, the retreat of the idea of singular science leaves unﬁ nished 
business in its wake. The traditional notion presented answers to a series of ques-
tions—answers that we no longer ﬁ nd adequate but have yet to replace fully. Science 
was supposed to present a single path to the truth, a truth that would necessarily 
prevail everywhere and would yield intellectual command over material practice. 
Science was supposed to be inherently egalitarian and public, yet unencumbered by 
economic interests or political forces. If we no longer ﬁ nd this vision convincing, we 
have to derive new ways to respond to the questions it was originally intended to an-
swer. We need new explanations for the extraordinary geographical range over which 
scientiﬁ c knowledge has proven itself, its intimate relationship with technology, and 
its institutionalization in diverse cultures. These questions of the character and con-
text of scientiﬁ c knowledge remain fundamental, even if we jettison the truisms by 
which they were traditionally answered. They constitute key issues surrounding the 
historical role of the sciences in the modern era. And it is the heritage of engagement 
with these issues that distinguishes what has been called the history of science from 
other ﬁ elds of historical study.
A lot has been done along these lines, though much still remains to be done. As 
singular science was deconstructed into a patchwork of diverse and localized forms 
of knowledge, the pressing issue arose of explaining how that knowledge escaped 
the local circumstances of its origin and was given more general acceptance. An-
swers have been sought in the various social mechanisms through which artifacts, 
people, and texts are mobilized. Practices of translation, replication, and metrology 
have taken the place of the universality that used to be assumed as an attribute of 
singular science. When science was thought of as the same everywhere, its unifor-
mity mapped directly onto that of nature itself. In the new view, science achieves 
its singularity—to the extent it does—as the result of practices that are socially and 
historically located. These practices have been brought under scrutiny by historians, 
sociologists, philosophers, and others, whose task has been to show how scientiﬁ c 
knowledge is made to seem universal and consistent—in other words, to ﬁ ll the gap 
left by the disappearance of the idea of singular science. Through their efforts, a 
fair amount has been revealed about the mechanisms by which scientiﬁ c knowledge 
has circulated through modern society and across geographical space.48 A picture is 
emerging that stresses the role of networks and circulation in allowing knowledge to 
47 Smith, Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature (Manchester, 
2007).
48 Surveys of this work include Steven Shapin, “Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientiﬁ c 
Knowledge,” Annu. Rev. Sociol. 21 (1995): 289– 321; Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Con-
structivism and the History of Science (Chicago, 2005); David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in Its 
Place: Geographies of Scientiﬁ c Knowledge (Chicago, 2003); James A. Secord, “Halifax Keynote 
Address: Knowledge in Transit,” Isis 95 (2004): 654– 72.
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transcend the cultures, languages, and communities within which it originates. We 
are beginning, in other words, to formulate an alternative model. But, as long as this 
remains a collective work in progress, we can still expect to have it measured against 
the all- too- easy answers provided by the notion of singular science. The legacy of 
that notion still bears heavily upon us, and is not easily to be shrugged off. We have 
not yet arrived at the point when we can forget science.
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